Epicureanism Page 19

  virtue A perfection of character (such as courage) or intellect (such as wisdom) that allows us to live well. The Epicureans controversially hold that they are valuable only instrumentally, for their contribution to pleasure, and not for their own sake.

  void (kenon) Absolutely empty space.

  Notes

  Preface

  1.

  B. Inwood & L. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, 2nd edn (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997) [IG] includes, in addition to its reading on Epicureanism, extensive selections of texts on Stoicism and Scepticism, which I occasionally refer to. However, for those who want only the texts on Epicureanism, an even cheaper alternative is their The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), which has all and only the Epicureanism texts from IG. The numbering is identical, except that The Epicurus Reader does not include the preface number “I”, which is used in IG to indicate that those texts are in the Epicureanism section. For example, (IG I-151) is also text 151 in The Epicurus Reader. Volume one of A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) [LS] contains the texts in English translation, along with commentary, while volume two has the Greek and Latin texts. IG has the advantages of being cheaper and of keeping together texts such as the Letter to Menoeceus, which are broken up into chunks and scattered here and there in LS. However, because LS groups texts by subject and includes extensive commentary on those texts, it is often easier to follow what is going on than in IG.

  1. Introduction: the life of Epicurus and the history of Epicureanism

  1.

  For readers interested in more information on the history of Epicureanism, I recommend The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, J. Warren (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), chapters 1 (“The Athenian Garden”, D. Clay), 2 (“Epicureanism in the Roman Republic”, D. Sedley), 3 (“Epicureanism in the Roman Empire”, M. Erler) and 15 (“Epicureanism in the Early Modern Period”, C. Wilson).

  2.

  Easily the best-preserved treatise of Philodemus is On Sign Inference (in Philodemus, On Methods of Inference, 2nd edn, P. De Lacey & E. De Lacey [trans.] [Naples: Bibliopolis, 1978]), although we have scholarly editions of many other (more fragmentary) treatises, such as On Piety and On Frank Criticism. V. Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) does a nice job of gathering together much of what Philodemus has to say about ethics. See M. Smith, (ed. & trans.), Diogenes of Oinoanda: The Epicurean Inscription (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1993) for most of the inscriptions of Diogenes of Oinoanda, and his “Excavations at Oinoanda: the New Epicurean Texts”, Anatolian Studies 48 (1998), 125–70, for a few additional inscriptions. See D. Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) for an excellent extended argument that Lucretius was an Epicurean “fundamentalist” who worked directly from Epicurus’ On Nature in composing De Rerum Natura, so that subsequent developments in Epicureanism had no impact on the poem.

  3.

  I shall not discuss them here. However, for interested readers, very brief (one-or two-sentence) descriptions of most of the sources that will subsequently be referred to can be found in the “Index of Sources” in LS vol. 1, 492–500.

  2. Atoms and void

  1.

  Zeno devised variants on the same basic argument: the Stadium (reported in Aristotle, Physics 239bll and Topics 160b7 [DK 29 A25]), and Achilles and the Tortoise (Aristotle Physics 239b14–18 [DK 29 A26]). I basically follow the argument as given in the Stadium.

  2.

  Whether Epicurus himself drew all of these conclusions, or whether some were drawn by later Epicureans, is not clear: see the commentary in LS §11 for more discussion.

  3.

  See G. Cambiano, “Philosophy, Science and Medicine”, in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, K. Algra (ed.), 585–613 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 587–90, for more on this topic.

  3. Atomic motion

  1.

  Whether Democritus thinks atoms have weight is unclear. Our sources are inconsistent; some have him attributing weight to them, while others explicitly deny it and say that weight is an Epicurean innovation. The usual way of reconciling these inconsistent reports is to say that having “weight” in the sense of a natural motion of direction is an Epicurean innovation, and that atoms have “weight” for Democritus in some other sense: either a tendency to move towards the centre of our cosmos when inside the cosmic vortex (the majority view), or in the sense closer to the modern concept of “mass”; D. O’Brien, Theories of Weight in the Ancient World: Four Essays on Democritus, Plato and Aristotle. A Study in the Development of Ideas. Volume One: Democritus, Weight and Size: An Exercise in the Reconstruction of Early Greek Philosophy (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1981). See D. Furley, “Aristotle and the Atomists on Motion in a Void”, in his Cosmic Problems, 77–90, esp. 80–81, for a good summary of the texts and the literature, and “Weight and Motion in Democritus’ Theory”, in Cosmic Problems, 91–102, for a summary of O’Brien and some pointed criticisms. Furley himself is alone in thinking that Democritus, like Epicurus, attributes to atoms a natural direction of motion; see my Epicurus on Freedom (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), 120 n.28, for some criticisms.

  2.

  See J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 92–5, for a brief discussion of this family of cosmological arguments.

  3.

  Most scholars who evaluate the cosmogonic argument simply consider it a failure, for the reasons given above. The charitable interpretation given here is my own. My Epicurus on Freedom, ch. 5 (a revised version of my “Does Epicurus Need the Swerve as an Archê of Collisions?”, Phronesis 41 [1996], 305–17) gives more details and argument, for those who wish to pursue the topic further or who harbour doubts about my proposal and want to see whether those doubts are justified.

  4.

  Jeffrey Purinton coined the happy name “swerviness”. See his “Epicurus on ‘Free Volition’ and the Atomic Swerve”, Phronesis 44(4) (1999), 253–99, esp. 271–2, for more on the sense in which swerves can be said to have some sort of cause.

  4. Sensible qualities

  1.

  Some of this chapter is adapted from my “The Ontological Status of Sensible Qualities for Democritus and Epicurus”, Ancient Philosophy 17(1997), 119–34, which gives further arguments in support of the interpretations of Democritus and Epicurus offered here. See T. Ganson, “Democritus against Reducing Sensible Qualities”, Ancient Philosophy 19 (1999), 201–15, for some criticisms of that interpretation of Democritus, and D. Furley, “Democritus and Epicurus on Sensible Qualities”, in Passions and Perceptions, J. Brunschwig & M. Nussbaum (eds), 72–94 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), D. Sedley, “Epicurean Anti-Reductionism”, in Matter and Metaphysics, J. Barnes & M. Mignucci (eds), 295–327 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1988), and R. Wardy, “Eleatic Pluralism”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 70 (1988), 125–46, for some other alternatives.

  2.

  Theophrastus’ De Sensibus is our primary source for Democritus’ theory of perception. Theophrastus was Aristotle’s successor as head of the Lyceum.

  3.

  For Theophrastus’ discussion of the sense of taste, see De Sensibus 65–70.

  4.

  See DRN IV 615–26 for the account of taste, DRN IV generally for sensation, with DRN IV 217–721 for each of the senses.

  5.

  Whether Democritus thinks that knowledge is merely difficult or impossible to attain is a matter of some dispute; see R. Hankinson, The Sceptics (London: Routledge, 1995), 47–50, and Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 201–5, for an introduction to some of the reports and issues regarding Democritus’ scepticism, and P. Curd, “Why Democritus Was Not a Skeptic”, in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, Vol. 6: Be
fore Plato, A. Preus (ed.), 149–69 (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001) for a recent argument that Democritus is not a sceptic and references to much of the literature on this topic. Fortunately, we do not need to settle this question to understand Epicurus. Democritus certainly said many things that appear sceptical. The Epicureans viewed him as a sceptic (see Against Colotes 1108f), and Epicurus is interested in avoiding the sceptical difficulties that Democritus runs into by challenging Democritus’ view on the unreality of sensible qualities, whether or not Democritus himself ultimately thinks that these difficulties can be overcome.

  5. Cosmology

  1.

  This phrase, and this way of organizing ancient cosmologies, comes from D. Furley, Cosmic Problems: Essays on Greek and Roman Philosophy of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

  2.

  De Caelo (On the heavens) is the fullest statement of Aristotle’s cosmology.

  6. Biology and language

  1.

  See fragments DK 31 B57, B60, and B61, and Aristotle Physics 198b-199b.

  2.

  Stoic lekta are not exactly propositions; propositions are one species of lekta. Long and Sedley translates lekta as “sayables”. “Complete” lekta are the meanings of statements (such as “my finger is cut”), and “incomplete” lekta are predicates (such as “is cut”). See LS §33 for more information.

  7. The mind

  1.

  Shortly after Epicurus’ time, medical discoveries made via vivisection gave excellent evidence that the mind is located in the head, not the chest. Lucretius himself follows Epicurus and shows no awareness of these advances, but other Epicureans were aware of them. See Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom, 68–72, for more information.

  2.

  Lucretius uses this dependence to show that the mind is not only corporeal, but also mortal.

  3.

  Some of this section is adapted from my “Action and Responsibility”, in The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism, J. Warren (ed.), 142–57 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

  4.

  These authors are discussed in J. Annas, “Epicurus on Agency”, in Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, Proceedings of the 5th Symposium Hellenisticum, J. Brunschwig & M. Nussbaum (eds) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 66–9. For Hermarchus on the differences between human and animal abilities, see Porphyry On Abstinence I 7–12.

  5.

  I think that the Epicureans’ reading of Democritus as an eliminativist is inconsistent with too many other things he says to be rightly ascribed to him, as Democritus seems to acknowledge the existence of temporary compound bodies like cosmoi: see my “The Ontological Status of Sensible Qualities”, 122–3, and C. Taylor, The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus. Fragments: A Text and Translation with a Commentary (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 152. The Epicureans likewise view Parmenides as eliminating all compound bodies, such as water and the cities of Europe and Asia, a reading that Plutarch disputes: see Against Colotes 1113f ff. (Many modern scholars would also dispute it: P. Curd, The Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997) is an excellent recent interpretation of Parmenides and his influence on later thinkers, and she would also disagree with Colotes.) However, it is not a lunatic reading of either Parmenides or Democritus, and some (e.g. Wardy, “Eleatic Pluralism”) defend the eliminative interpretation of Democritus. R. Pasnau, “Democritus and Secondary Qualities”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 89 (2007), 99–121, is agnostic but thinks this “radical” reading has much going for it, and he gives a thoughtful discussion of what exactly the position amounts to.

  6.

  See my Epicurus on Freedom, 68–9.

  7.

  See P. van Inwagen, Material Beings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990) for an extended argument that no (non-biological) composite material objects exist.

  8.

  For much more detail, see my Epicurus on Freedom, ch. 4. C. Atherton, “Reductionism, Rationality and Responsibility: A Discussion of Tim O’Keefe, Epicurus on Freedom”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 89 (2007), 192–230, gives detailed criticisms of my interpretations of these texts.

  9.

  See S. Laursen, “The Early Parts of Epicurus On Nature 25th Book”, Cronache Ercolanesi 25 (1995), 5–109, and “The Later Parts of Epicurus On Nature 25th Book”, Cronache Ercolanesi 27 (1997), 5–82, for the latest edition of On Nature 25. The passage discussed here is mostly from Laursen, “The Later Parts”, 19–23. But much more easily accessible is an earlier version of the Greek text (LS vol. 2, 20B and 20C), translations of which can be found in LS vol. 1, 20 B and 20C and IG 34.

  10.

  This view was first advanced by David Sedley See D. Sedley, “Epicurus’ Refutation of Determinism”, in Suzètèsis: Studi sull’epicureismo greco e romano offerti a M. Gigante, vol. I, 11–51 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1983) and “Epicurean Anti-Reductionism” for this “radical emergence” interpretation; a shorter synopsis of the view can be found in the commentary in LS §20.

  8. Freedom and determinism

  1.

  See my Epicurus on Freedom for a detailed considerations of the issues treated here; some of this chapter is adapted from that book and from my “Action and Responsibility”. Readers should be aware that the interpretation presented in this chapter is highly controversial, as is every interpretation of this topic.

  2.

  C. Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (New York: Russell and Russell, [1928] 1964), 838–42, and Titi Lvcreti Cari:De Rervm Natvra: Libri Sex (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), 318–23, 433–7, Purinton, “Epicurus on ‘Free Volition’“, and D. Fowler, Lucretius on Atomic Motion: A Commentary on De rerum natura 2.1–332 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), commentary on DRN II 251–93 and appendix 1, all advance (roughly) this view, which is probably the most common interpretation. See my Epicurus on Freedom, ch. 2, for more discussion of this family of views and of DRN II 251–93.

  3.

  For example, see P. Huby, “The First Discovery of the Freewill Problem”, Philosophy 42 (1967), 353–62; LS vol. 1, 107; E. Asmis, “Free Action and the Swerve”, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 8 (1990), 275.

  4.

  See D. Furley, 1967. Two Studies in the Greek Atomists (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), 163, and my Epicurus on Freedom, 44–6.

  5.

  Lucretius describes the atomic basis of voluntas and action in book four of DRN, especially DRN IV 877–906. In his description, swerves play no direct role in the production of action. The action-theory in DRN IV seems “mechanistic”, in the sense that, given the incoming stimulus and the state of the soul, action follows automatically. See Furley, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists, 210–26, and my Epicurus on Freedom, 37–42.

  6.

  This terminology comes from LS vol. 1, 466.

  7.

  Since Carneades is a sceptic, we should be careful in speaking about his positions or his beliefs. One common sceptical procedure was to advance arguments in support of a position simply in order to counterbalance the arguments for an opposing position, without the sceptic himself being committed to the argument or its conclusion. But for ease of reading, I shall simply speak of the arguments advanced by Carneades in On Fate as if he endorses them. Cicero, at least, seems to endorse them. See H. Thorsrud, Ancient Scepticism (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008), chs 4, 5, for more on these issues.

  8.

  This has striking similarities to modern notions of “agent causation”. For an influential presentation of such a view, see R. Chisholm, “Human Freedom and the Self”, reprinted in Free Will, G. Watson (ed.), 7–29 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1964] 1982).

  9.

  David Sedley, who advances the “radical emergence” view of the self, which has similarities to Carneades’ view (see Ch. 7, § �
�Reason and the reality of the mental”), does think that Epicurus had reason to posit the swerve. Without the swerve, the “radically emergent” self would have no “elbow room” in which to exercise its power, as the laws governing atomic motion would be sufficient to determine what occurs in my mind. But this is mistaken: if we grant that there is a “radically emergent” self that gains causal independence from the atoms that constitute the mind, then ex hypothesi the basic laws that give the motions of individual atoms are not always sufficient to determine the motions of mind, as there is an additional causal factor at work.

  9. Scepticism

  1.

  This is how Myles Burnyeat puts it in “The Upside-down Back-to-front Sceptic of Lucretius IV 472”, Philologus 122 (1978), 197–206, esp. 205. My discussion here is indebted to his.

  2.

  What understanding the sceptics themselves have of the “plausible” is highly controversial. The term that Carneades uses here translated “plausible”, pithanon, can go either way. The majority (but far from consensus) view is that for Carneades pithanon is mere subjective convincingness. On the other hand, Cicero seems to consider the plausible to be more probably true than not. See Thorsrud, Ancient Scepticism, chs 4, 5, for much more on these issues.

  3.

  I radically oversimplify. Sextus includes in the sceptic’s criteria of action (i) laws and customs (such as our convention that cannibalism is bad) and (ii) kinds of expertise such as medicine. But getting into how a sceptic can incorporate these additional practical criteria would take us too far afield from the topic at hand. See Thorsrud, Ancient Scepticism, ch. 9 for more on the life of a Pyrrhonist, and M. Burnyeat, “Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?” in Doubt and Dogmatism, J. Barnes, M. Burnyeat & M. Schofield (eds), 20–53 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) for a fascinating and influential discussion of whether Pyrrhonian Scepticism is liveable.