Epicureanism Read online

  10. The canon

  1.

  See Lucretius DRN IV 353–63 for a discussion of the square tower in the distance. I borrow the eye/camera analogy to explain the truth of impressions from Long and Sedley’s commentary on the truth of all impressions; LS, vol. 1, 83–6.

  2.

  On Nature 25 26–30 (LS 20C). The text is much less clear than my brief synopsis makes it appear. It is one of the papyri found in the Epicurean library in Herculaneum that was buried in the eruption of Mount Vesuvius, which also destroyed the town of Pompeii. The text is gappy and bristles with unexplained technical terminology. See my Epicurus on Freedom, 89–93, for more detail on my reading of the text.

  3.

  Plutarch makes an objection to the Epicureans along these general lines, although it differs somewhat, in Against Colotes 1121c-e.

  11. Pleasure, the highest good

  1.

  Nicomachean Ethics I i lays out the basic framework very clearly. See J. Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), ch. 1, for an excellent discussion of this common ethical framework.

  2.

  See Nicomachean Ethics I vii for Aristotle’s famous “function argument”, in which he grounds his conception of happiness in a human “function” (ergon) supplied by our human nature.

  3.

  In fact the thesis applies to animals generally, not just human beings.

  4.

  Interestingly, Torquatus notes that some Epicureans express doubts that this sort of proof was sufficient (On Ends I 31).

  5.

  See Mill’s proof of the principle of utility in chapter four of Utilitarianism.

  12. Varieties of pleasure, varieties of desire

  1.

  Indeed, Gisela Striker, “Epicurean Hedonism”, in Passions and Perceptions, J. Brunschwig & M. Nussbaum (ed.), 3–17 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) (reprinted in her Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, 196–208 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996]) argues that something like this is precisely the Epicurean position: that all pleasures (both kinetic and katastematic) are simply identical to the absence of pain. This, of courses, raises the pressing question of why Epicurus would then call them pleasures. Striker suggests that perhaps this is because any time we are aware of being in a state of painlessness, our awareness will also involve various sensory states we are undergoing.

  2.

  J. Gosling & C. Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), chs 18–19, first put forward something like the interpretation I sketch below, with K. Arenson, Pleasure and the Absence of Pain: Reading Epicurus’ Hedonism Through Plato’s Philebus, PhD dissertation, Emory University (2009) modifying their account in the face of objections and developing it at much greater length.

  3.

  Porphyry, On Abstinence 1.51.6–52.1, LS 21J. Generally speaking, the Epicureans are hard on sexual desire. They admit sexual desire is natural, but insist that it is unnecessary because you can have a happy life without satisfying it. The Epicureans asserts that sex never helped anybody, and you should be content if at least it does no harm. The wise person will marry and have children when the circumstances indicate it, but he will not fall in love (DL X 118–19). Lucretius has a long, detailed and bitter polemic against romantic love (DRN IV 1058–1208), in which he rails against the ways in which it distorts the lover’s judgement and disturbs his peace of mind.

  13. The virtues and philosophy

  1.

  In other contexts, to kalon can mean “the beautiful”, as in the ultimate object of erotic desire in Plato’s dialogue the Symposium.

  2.

  Porphyry To Marcella 31 (IG I-124); trans. adapted from IG.

  3.

  Against Colotes 1117f (IG I-125); DRN1 146–8, II 259–61, III 91–3, VI 39–41.

  4.

  The following remarks are inspired by the much more extensive discussion in Nussbaum (1986), although I do not directly follow her way of framing the issue.

  5.

  For instance, Epicurus allegedly called his erstwhile teacher Nausiphanes a “jellyfish”, the followers of Plato “the toadies of Dionysius”, and Aristotle a profligate who took to selling drugs after squandering his inheritance (DL X 8).

  6.

  A characteristic statement of Cicero’s attitude is Academica 2.7–9 (IG III-21, LS 68S).

  14. Justice

  1.

  This raises the question of whether human beings who are unable to enter into agreements about how to behave (such as small children and the severely mentally disabled) are included in the justice contract. On the one hand, the same reasoning that excludes non-human animals would seem to apply to them also. On the other hand, Lucretius clearly includes children when describing the first “justice contract” (DENY 1011–27). The answer is probably that they cannot be direct parties to the contract, but they can be indirectly covered in so far as the parties include in their agreement standards about how to treat these other people. (Lucretius says that the first “justice contractors” claimed protection for their women and children.)

  2.

  See Diogenes of Oinoanda fr. 56, in Smith, Diogenes of Oinoanda. This implies, perhaps surprisingly, that there can be justice apart from law. My own view is that such a community would still need agreements about how to behave in order for the members to avoid indirectly and inadvertently harming one another, but would not need any enforcement mechanism to compel adherence to that agreement. See my “Would a Society of Wise Epicureans Be Just?”, Ancient Philosophy 21 (2001), 133–46, for more on this issue.

  3.

  It is worth noting that many Roman Epicureans — such as Cassius, who helped assassinate Julius Caesar — ignored this advice.

  15. Friendship

  1.

  See D. O’Connor, “The Invulnerable Pleasures of Epicurean Friendship”, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 30 (1989), 165–86, for much more on the communal nature of Epicurean friendship. In fact, O’Connor thinks that, for the Epicureans, philia is better translated by “fellowship” than by the usual “friendship”.

  2.

  Philodemus col. XIXb, in Philodemus: On Frank Criticism, D. Kontan, D. Clay & C. Glad (ed. & trans.) (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 1998). See also the editors’ introduction, pp. 5–8 and 10–20, and Fr. 15, 28, 41, 43, 50, 81, and 84.

  3.

  Cicero derides the celebrations of Epicurus’ birthday in On Ends II 99–103. For more discussion of the details of the Epicurean communities and how they had celebrations, mugs of Epicurus and so on, see D. Clay, Paradosis and Survival: Three Chapters in the History of Epicurean Philosophy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998).

  4.

  For instance, see P. Mitsis, Epicurus’ Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), ch. 3, and Annas, The Morality of Happiness, ch. 11. The account of Epicurean friendship in this chapter is adapted from my “Is Epicurean Friendship Altruistic?”, Apeiron 34 (2001), 269–305, which goes into the details of the texts and competing interpretations of them at more tedious length than here.

  5.

  The Latin term here translated “love” (diligo), as well as the Greek term for “friendship love”, phileo, allow for such a “behavioural” sense (see my “Is Epicurean Friendship Altruistic?”, 295–7, for more). If “love” seems more difficult to interpret in such a way, substitute the word “care”: in one sense, the Epicurean sage cares for his friends as much as for himself (in the sense of what he does), while in another he cares only about himself (in the sense of what he ultimately values).

  6.

  From “Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature,” in David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, rev. edn (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1985), 85–6.

  7.

  These thoughts regarding such apparently independent mental pleasures of friendship in Epicureanism a
re inspired by M. Strahm, Epicurean Friendship: How are Friends Pleasurable?, Master’s thesis, Georgia State University (2009), which explores these issues in greater depth.

  16. The gods

  1.

  The basic line of interpretation below, plus many of the arguments in favour of it, are taken from LS §23.

  17. Death

  1.

  See J. Warren, Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 199–212, for an interesting discussion of the Epicureans and suicide. The Epicurean sage seems to have no positive reason to want to continue living, since his life is complete, and so no good reason not to kill himself. Of course, as long as his life is basically pleasant, he has no good reason to kill himself either. Warren concludes that Epicureans “offer no significant positive reason for wishing to continue to live, beyond a mere inertia”, which is “quite unappealing” (ibid.: 210).

  2.

  Nagel argues for this by drawing an analogy to a stroke victim who is reduced to an infantile state. The victim in the infantile state is not bothered by his condition, so it does not seem quite right to say that he is being harmed at that time. Instead, if anybody is being harmed, it is the person who existed prior to the stroke, who was reduced to the infantile state by the stroke.

  3.

  For great detail on Epicurus’ will, see Warren, Facing Death, 161–99. Warren also argues that having the sort of concern for what occurs after one’s death that goes into the writing of wills and carefully ensuring that their provisions will be carried out is inconsistent with the Epicurean position that death is “nothing to us”. I am not convinced; see my review of Warren, Facing Death in Ancient Philosophy 26 (2006), 430–35.

  4.

  See Tsouna, The Ethics of Philodemus, ch. 2 for more on bites in the ethics of Philodemus.

  5.

  For more on this idea, see my “Lucretius on the Cycle of Life and the Fear of Death”, Apeiron 36 (2003), 43–65, esp. §4.

  Further reading

  1. Introduction: The life of Epicurus and the history of Epicureanism

  Ancient sources  DL X 1–16 (parts of which are in IG I-1); DRN I 1–135. (The opening statements of purpose and eulogies to Epicurus at the beginnings of the other five books of De Rerum Natura are also instructive regarding the practical and evangelical cast of Epicureanism.)

  For those interested in Epicureanism as a social movement and a basis as community, see Diskin Clay’s “Individual and Community in the First Generation of the Epicurean School”, in Paradosis and Survival (1998), ch. 4. For an excellent discussion of what is involved with self-identifying as a member of a philosophical movement in Hellenistic times, see David Sedley’s “Philosophical Allegiance in the Greco-Roman world” (1989). Sedley argues that it involves “a virtually religious commitment to the authority of a founder figure” (ibid.: 119), and he shows in detail how this attitude influences the activities of later Epicureans.

  2. Atoms and void

  Ancient sources  Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 38–41, 54–9, 68–73 (IG I-2 38–41, 54–9, 68–73; LS 4A, 5A, 7B, 8A, 9A, 12D); DRN I 146–634 (LS 4B, 4C, 5B, 6A, 7A, 8B, 9C), II 730–1022 (LS 12E); Sext. Emp. Math. X 219–27 (IG I-89, LS 7C), X 257 (IG I-82).

  David Sedley’s “Two Conceptions of Vacuum” (1982) argues that Democritus and the Epicureans actually had two very different conceptions of void: Democritus thought of void as emptiness, a sort of privative stuff that could move around (for instance, to fill a space previously occupied by an atom), whereas the Epicureans think void is simply unoccupied space. David Furley’s “Indivisible Magnitudes” in his Two Studies in the Greek Atomists (1967) is a groundbreaking look at the Epicurean theory of spatial minima, and its background in Zeno, Aristotle and others.

  3. Atomic motion

  Ancient sources  Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 43–4, 60–62 (IG I-2 43–4, 60–62; LS 11A, 10C, 11E); DRN II 184–250 (IG I-28; LS 11H); Aëtius I.3.18ff. (IG I-77).

  The main topic of Walter Englert’s Epicurus on the Swerve and Voluntary Action (1987) is the swerve’s role in preserving free action. However, chapters 2 and 3 (“The Nature of the Swerve” and “The Swerve and Epicurean Physics”) are good places to go for discussions of how exactly the swerve is supposed to work physically (Is it a 90 degree turn to the side, or an oblique 45 degree turn? What happens when there is a swerve by an atom that is not falling straight down?) as well as more in-depth treatments of many topics mentioned in passing here. Furley’s “Aristotle and the Atomists on Motion in a Void” in his Cosmic Problems (1989) argues that the scholarly near-consensus on Democritus, that atoms have no natural direction of motion, is mistaken.

  4. Sensible qualities

  Ancient sources  Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 68–71 (IG I-2 68–71; LS 7B); Plut. Adv. Col. 1109a–1112e (IG I-29; LS 16I); Polystratus On Irrational Contempt 23.26–26.23 (LS 7D).

  David Furley’s “Democritus and Epicurus on Sensible Qualities” (1993) argues that Democritus’ position on sensible qualities is a result of his debt to Eleatic philosophers such as Parmenides and Melissus and that Epicurus runs into the same sceptical difficulties as Democritus despite his efforts to avoid them. I think that both these contentions are mistaken (see my “The Ontological Status of Sensible Qualities” [1997] for the reasons), but this paper is stimulating and astute, and a good point of entry for the textual and philosophical issues. Although Mi-Kyoung Lee’s Epistemology after Protagoras (2005) deals only in passing with Epicureanism (mainly with the Epicureans’ portrayals of Democritus), this book is an excellent study of the relationship between relativism and scepticism in ancient philosophy.

  5. Cosmology

  Ancient sources  Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 41–5 73–4, 76–7 (IG I-2 41–5 73–4, 76–7; LS 10A, 12B, 11A, 13A); Ep. Pyth. 88–91 (IG I-3 88–91; LS 13B); KD 1 (IG I-5 1; LS 23E4); DRN I 1–101, 951–1051 (LS 10B), II 184–215, 1048–104 (LS 13D), V 91–613 (LS 13F, 18D), VI 160–422; Simp. in Phys. 203b15 (IG I-90), 198b29 (IG I-111); Lactant. On the Anger of God 13.20–22 (IG I-109).

  David Furley’s “The Greek Theory of the Infinite Universe” (1981) is a nuanced exploration of the philosophical motivations of the atomist theory of an “infinite universe”, which concludes that a desire for a unified theory of motion was paramount.

  6. Biology and language

  Ancient sources  Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 75–6 (IG I-2 75–6; LS 19A); DRN IV 823–57 (LS 13E), V 772–1090 (LS 13I, 19B, 22K); Simp. in Phys. 198b29 (IG I-111); Diogenes of Oinoanda 10.2.11 ff. (LS 19C).

  Gordon Campbell’s Lucretius on Creation and Evolution (2003) is a detailed commentary on De rerum natura V 772–1104, which deals with the origins of species, society and language. As a commentary, it deals with many textual issues on a line-by-line basis, but along the way and in its introduction it also raises many interesting philosophical questions about the doctrines and how they relate to later Darwinian theories. Alexander Verlinsky’s “Epicurus and his Predecessors on the Origins of Language” (2005) is a careful, detailed, and sympathetic reconstruction of the Epicurean theory, which highlights the continuity between Epicurus’ philosophy of language and his general opposition to teleology.

  7. The mind

  Ancient sources  Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 63–7 (IG I-2 63–7; LS 14A); Epicurus On Nature XXV 19–30 (IG I-34; LS 20B, 20C); DRN III 94–869 (LS 14B, 14D, 14F, 14G, 14H 14J); Plut. Adv. Col. 110e–1111b (IG I-29), 1116c–d.

  David Sedley’s “Epicurean Anti-Reductionism” (1998), as the title suggests, argues against the sort of “reductionist” interpretation of Epicurus put forward in this chapter and, as such, it has been highly influential, both in attracting supporters and in spurring opponents to articulate the case against Sedley Robert Pasnau’s “Democritus and Secondary Qualities” (2007) argues that it is anachronistic to attribute the distinction between primary and secondary qualities to Democritus and, in so doing, he opens issues of how to understand Democritus’ ontology generally. It includes an excellent discuss
ion of the Epicureans’ view that Democritus is an eliminativist regarding compound bodies.

  8. Freedom and determinism

  Ancient sources  Epicurus Ep. Men. 133–4 (IG I-4 133–4; LS 20A); DRN II 251–93 (IG I-28; LS 20F), IV 877–906 (LS 14E); Cic. Fat. 18–48 (IG I-15; LS 20E, 70G, 55S, 20H, 34C, 62C).

  My Epicurus on Freedom (2005) gives more extended arguments for the (controversial) conclusions advanced in this chapter, plus pointers to much of the recent literature. James Warrens “Epicureans and the Present Past” (2006) deals with an interesting question raised by the Epicureans’ treatment of statements regarding the future: what are the truth-makers for statements regarding the past?

  9. Scepticism

  Ancient sources  DRN IV 469–521 (IG I-27; LS 16A).

  Myles Burnyeat’s “The Upside-down Back-to-front Sceptic of Lucretius 4.472” (1978) starts with an apparently narrow textual question: why does Lucretius describe the sceptic using the odd imagery of the sceptic not merely standing on his head, but also back to front? But in coming to an answer to that question, Burnyeat goes on to consider more broadly the way the Epicurean “self-refutation” argument against the sceptics is supposed to work.